全球經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于重要關(guān)口,可能會(huì)影響未來數(shù)年的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮發(fā)展。幾十年來,我們第一次同時(shí)面臨高通脹和金融斷層線。為了防止問題變得根深蒂固,現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候該對(duì)當(dāng)前政策的作用與局限進(jìn)行客觀的反思了。
隨著供應(yīng)鏈正?;?、大宗商品價(jià)格下跌以及各國央行開始實(shí)施多年來最強(qiáng)有力且最同步的貨幣緊縮政策,全球通脹已經(jīng)從峰值滑落。正如我們?cè)谧钚鹿嫉膰H清算銀行年度經(jīng)濟(jì)報(bào)告(BIS Annual Economic Report)中所述的那樣,歷史表明,通脹飆升后通常需要一年的時(shí)間才能夠回落至先前的水平,即便在經(jīng)濟(jì)局勢(shì)不那么嚴(yán)峻的非后疫情時(shí)期也是如此。
在此背景下,一些市場(chǎng)開始認(rèn)為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)將有望實(shí)現(xiàn)軟著陸。然而,我們必須準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)使經(jīng)濟(jì)前景充滿不確定性的重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
其中一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是高通脹可能持續(xù)下去。市場(chǎng)或許會(huì)出現(xiàn)新的價(jià)格壓力。在許多國家,由于工資上漲的速度趕不上通脹,家庭購買力有所下降。隨著就業(yè)市場(chǎng)吃緊,勞動(dòng)者可能會(huì)力求緩解這種不平衡的狀況。公司會(huì)更容易提高價(jià)格,而可能將上升的成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給顧客,導(dǎo)致惡性循環(huán)。這種情況一旦發(fā)生,就很難停止。
與此同時(shí),干擾金融穩(wěn)定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素也出現(xiàn)了。當(dāng)前,債務(wù)與資產(chǎn)價(jià)格均高于以往加息時(shí)期的水平。迄今為止,新冠疫情時(shí)代的儲(chǔ)蓄和低借貸成本年份約定的較長貸款期限仍然可以發(fā)揮一定的緩沖作用。但這些緩沖也很快要耗盡了。等到緩沖消失后,經(jīng)濟(jì)增速可能會(huì)低于當(dāng)前的預(yù)測(cè)。
這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致信貸損失,由此帶來財(cái)務(wù)壓力。脆弱的銀行面臨著受挫的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。從歷史上看,銀行業(yè)的承壓往往會(huì)導(dǎo)致加息。而高債務(wù)、高資產(chǎn)價(jià)格和高通脹會(huì)進(jìn)一步加大銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。目前的情況完全相符。盡管銀行的抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)能力有所增強(qiáng),但其依然存在一定的脆弱性,尤其是當(dāng)旨在增強(qiáng)銀行抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性的規(guī)定不適用于中小銀行時(shí)。正如最近的經(jīng)驗(yàn)所表明的那樣,即便是小型機(jī)構(gòu)也可能悄然引發(fā)系統(tǒng)性崩潰。非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)也將迎來挑戰(zhàn)。自大金融危機(jī)(Great Financial Crisis)結(jié)束以來,這類投資公司取得了突飛猛進(jìn)的發(fā)展。它們當(dāng)中充斥著隱性杠桿和流動(dòng)性錯(cuò)配的問題。另外,適用于長期低利率時(shí)代的業(yè)務(wù)模式在長期高利率時(shí)代亦將面臨嚴(yán)峻的考驗(yàn)。
空虛的國庫使得形勢(shì)更加不明朗。當(dāng)金融動(dòng)蕩十分嚴(yán)重時(shí),就會(huì)迫使政府介入以為市場(chǎng)提供支持。這會(huì)打擊經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,導(dǎo)致削減財(cái)政收入。這樣一來,本就較高的公共債務(wù)水平會(huì)繼續(xù)抬升。反過來,市場(chǎng)對(duì)政府償債能力的質(zhì)疑又會(huì)進(jìn)一步加劇金融動(dòng)蕩。
政策制定者應(yīng)該如何應(yīng)對(duì)這些挑戰(zhàn)?各國央行的任務(wù)顯而易見:必須恢復(fù)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定。適應(yīng)永久性高通脹需要付出巨大的代價(jià),特別是對(duì)于我們社會(huì)中最弱勢(shì)的群體來說。
為了讓各國央行擁有更大的空間對(duì)抗通貨膨脹,必須出臺(tái)更多措施以確保金融機(jī)構(gòu)和金融系統(tǒng)的安全與穩(wěn)定。監(jiān)管不足的國家或需推出新的監(jiān)管規(guī)定。各國央行與政府應(yīng)該共同協(xié)作,收緊宏觀審慎政策,從而減輕利率上升給銀行帶來的壓力。而更嚴(yán)格的銀行監(jiān)管則能夠彌補(bǔ)近期銀行破產(chǎn)案例暴露出來的監(jiān)管漏洞。我們督促政策制定者立即實(shí)施巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ(Basel III)。
必須鞏固財(cái)政政策。這也有助于抵抗通貨膨脹和增強(qiáng)金融韌性。而且,此舉還可以及時(shí)為未來的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退提供緩沖。
最重要的是,政策的制定需要著眼長遠(yuǎn)。貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策在維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長方面承擔(dān)了太多負(fù)擔(dān)。因此,它們嚴(yán)格測(cè)試了我們所說的“穩(wěn)定區(qū)域”(region of stability)——即一系列貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策,這些政策能夠支持經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融持續(xù)穩(wěn)定,并且緩解兩類政策之間不可避免的矛盾——的邊界。歷史表明,超出這些界限就會(huì)引發(fā)高通脹、經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,以及銀行業(yè)、貨幣或主權(quán)危機(jī)。
政策制定者在設(shè)定目標(biāo)時(shí)必須采取務(wù)實(shí)的態(tài)度。高通脹和金融動(dòng)蕩的出現(xiàn)并非偶然事件。這是一個(gè)漫長過程的結(jié)果,并在很大程度上反映,政策制定者高估了貨幣政策實(shí)現(xiàn)通脹小目標(biāo)的能力,而且像大多數(shù)人一樣認(rèn)為宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策可以無限期推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,而不會(huì)導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹。
政策制定者需要改變觀念。他們必須認(rèn)識(shí)到反復(fù)采取緊急措施的弊端,即這種做法雖然能夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)促進(jìn)產(chǎn)出,但在經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)增長后卻無法重建緩沖。為了推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)長期繁榮,各國政府需要使一直被忽視的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革重新運(yùn)作起來。如果逃避現(xiàn)實(shí),我們就有可能失去社會(huì)對(duì)政策決策應(yīng)有的信任。從長遠(yuǎn)來看,只有價(jià)格與金融穩(wěn)定才可以確保更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者阿古斯丁·卡斯滕斯(Agustín Carstens)是國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的行長。
Fortune.com上發(fā)表的評(píng)論文章中表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn),僅代表作者本人的觀點(diǎn),不代表《財(cái)富》雜志的觀點(diǎn)和立場(chǎng)。
譯者:中慧言-劉嘉歡
全球經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于重要關(guān)口,可能會(huì)影響未來數(shù)年的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮發(fā)展。幾十年來,我們第一次同時(shí)面臨高通脹和金融斷層線。為了防止問題變得根深蒂固,現(xiàn)在是時(shí)候該對(duì)當(dāng)前政策的作用與局限進(jìn)行客觀的反思了。
隨著供應(yīng)鏈正?;?、大宗商品價(jià)格下跌以及各國央行開始實(shí)施多年來最強(qiáng)有力且最同步的貨幣緊縮政策,全球通脹已經(jīng)從峰值滑落。正如我們?cè)谧钚鹿嫉膰H清算銀行年度經(jīng)濟(jì)報(bào)告(BIS Annual Economic Report)中所述的那樣,歷史表明,通脹飆升后通常需要一年的時(shí)間才能夠回落至先前的水平,即便在經(jīng)濟(jì)局勢(shì)不那么嚴(yán)峻的非后疫情時(shí)期也是如此。
在此背景下,一些市場(chǎng)開始認(rèn)為全球經(jīng)濟(jì)將有望實(shí)現(xiàn)軟著陸。然而,我們必須準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)使經(jīng)濟(jì)前景充滿不確定性的重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
其中一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是高通脹可能持續(xù)下去。市場(chǎng)或許會(huì)出現(xiàn)新的價(jià)格壓力。在許多國家,由于工資上漲的速度趕不上通脹,家庭購買力有所下降。隨著就業(yè)市場(chǎng)吃緊,勞動(dòng)者可能會(huì)力求緩解這種不平衡的狀況。公司會(huì)更容易提高價(jià)格,而可能將上升的成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁給顧客,導(dǎo)致惡性循環(huán)。這種情況一旦發(fā)生,就很難停止。
與此同時(shí),干擾金融穩(wěn)定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素也出現(xiàn)了。當(dāng)前,債務(wù)與資產(chǎn)價(jià)格均高于以往加息時(shí)期的水平。迄今為止,新冠疫情時(shí)代的儲(chǔ)蓄和低借貸成本年份約定的較長貸款期限仍然可以發(fā)揮一定的緩沖作用。但這些緩沖也很快要耗盡了。等到緩沖消失后,經(jīng)濟(jì)增速可能會(huì)低于當(dāng)前的預(yù)測(cè)。
這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致信貸損失,由此帶來財(cái)務(wù)壓力。脆弱的銀行面臨著受挫的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。從歷史上看,銀行業(yè)的承壓往往會(huì)導(dǎo)致加息。而高債務(wù)、高資產(chǎn)價(jià)格和高通脹會(huì)進(jìn)一步加大銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。目前的情況完全相符。盡管銀行的抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)能力有所增強(qiáng),但其依然存在一定的脆弱性,尤其是當(dāng)旨在增強(qiáng)銀行抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性的規(guī)定不適用于中小銀行時(shí)。正如最近的經(jīng)驗(yàn)所表明的那樣,即便是小型機(jī)構(gòu)也可能悄然引發(fā)系統(tǒng)性崩潰。非銀行金融機(jī)構(gòu)也將迎來挑戰(zhàn)。自大金融危機(jī)(Great Financial Crisis)結(jié)束以來,這類投資公司取得了突飛猛進(jìn)的發(fā)展。它們當(dāng)中充斥著隱性杠桿和流動(dòng)性錯(cuò)配的問題。另外,適用于長期低利率時(shí)代的業(yè)務(wù)模式在長期高利率時(shí)代亦將面臨嚴(yán)峻的考驗(yàn)。
空虛的國庫使得形勢(shì)更加不明朗。當(dāng)金融動(dòng)蕩十分嚴(yán)重時(shí),就會(huì)迫使政府介入以為市場(chǎng)提供支持。這會(huì)打擊經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,導(dǎo)致削減財(cái)政收入。這樣一來,本就較高的公共債務(wù)水平會(huì)繼續(xù)抬升。反過來,市場(chǎng)對(duì)政府償債能力的質(zhì)疑又會(huì)進(jìn)一步加劇金融動(dòng)蕩。
政策制定者應(yīng)該如何應(yīng)對(duì)這些挑戰(zhàn)?各國央行的任務(wù)顯而易見:必須恢復(fù)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定。適應(yīng)永久性高通脹需要付出巨大的代價(jià),特別是對(duì)于我們社會(huì)中最弱勢(shì)的群體來說。
為了讓各國央行擁有更大的空間對(duì)抗通貨膨脹,必須出臺(tái)更多措施以確保金融機(jī)構(gòu)和金融系統(tǒng)的安全與穩(wěn)定。監(jiān)管不足的國家或需推出新的監(jiān)管規(guī)定。各國央行與政府應(yīng)該共同協(xié)作,收緊宏觀審慎政策,從而減輕利率上升給銀行帶來的壓力。而更嚴(yán)格的銀行監(jiān)管則能夠彌補(bǔ)近期銀行破產(chǎn)案例暴露出來的監(jiān)管漏洞。我們督促政策制定者立即實(shí)施巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ(Basel III)。
必須鞏固財(cái)政政策。這也有助于抵抗通貨膨脹和增強(qiáng)金融韌性。而且,此舉還可以及時(shí)為未來的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退提供緩沖。
最重要的是,政策的制定需要著眼長遠(yuǎn)。貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策在維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長方面承擔(dān)了太多負(fù)擔(dān)。因此,它們嚴(yán)格測(cè)試了我們所說的“穩(wěn)定區(qū)域”(region of stability)——即一系列貨幣政策和財(cái)政政策,這些政策能夠支持經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融持續(xù)穩(wěn)定,并且緩解兩類政策之間不可避免的矛盾——的邊界。歷史表明,超出這些界限就會(huì)引發(fā)高通脹、經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退,以及銀行業(yè)、貨幣或主權(quán)危機(jī)。
政策制定者在設(shè)定目標(biāo)時(shí)必須采取務(wù)實(shí)的態(tài)度。高通脹和金融動(dòng)蕩的出現(xiàn)并非偶然事件。這是一個(gè)漫長過程的結(jié)果,并在很大程度上反映,政策制定者高估了貨幣政策實(shí)現(xiàn)通脹小目標(biāo)的能力,而且像大多數(shù)人一樣認(rèn)為宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策可以無限期推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,而不會(huì)導(dǎo)致通貨膨脹。
政策制定者需要改變觀念。他們必須認(rèn)識(shí)到反復(fù)采取緊急措施的弊端,即這種做法雖然能夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)低迷時(shí)促進(jìn)產(chǎn)出,但在經(jīng)濟(jì)恢復(fù)增長后卻無法重建緩沖。為了推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)長期繁榮,各國政府需要使一直被忽視的結(jié)構(gòu)性改革重新運(yùn)作起來。如果逃避現(xiàn)實(shí),我們就有可能失去社會(huì)對(duì)政策決策應(yīng)有的信任。從長遠(yuǎn)來看,只有價(jià)格與金融穩(wěn)定才可以確保更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))
本文作者阿古斯丁·卡斯滕斯(Agustín Carstens)是國際清算銀行(Bank for International Settlements)的行長。
Fortune.com上發(fā)表的評(píng)論文章中表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn),僅代表作者本人的觀點(diǎn),不代表《財(cái)富》雜志的觀點(diǎn)和立場(chǎng)。
譯者:中慧言-劉嘉歡
The global economy is at a critical juncture that could weigh on prosperity for years to come. For the first time in decades, we face a combination of high inflation and financial fault lines. To stop these problems from becoming entrenched, it’s time for a reality check on what current policy settings can and cannot achieve.
Global inflation has crept down from its peaks as supply chains normalized, commodity prices fell and central banks embarked on the strongest and most synchronized monetary policy tightening in years. As we report in the latest BIS Annual Economic Report, history shows that it typically takes a year for inflation to return to its previous level after surges, even during episodes less acute than the one following the pandemic.
Against this backdrop, there is an emerging sense of hope in some quarters that the global economy will achieve a soft, or soft-ish, landing. But we must be ready to tackle the significant risks that cloud the outlook.
One risk is that high inflation could persist. New price pressures could emerge. In many countries, households’ purchasing power has fallen, as wages have not kept pace with inflation. With tight job markets, workers may seek to redress the balance. Firms have found it easier to raise prices and may pass higher costs on to consumers, creating a vicious cycle. Once this sets in, it is hard to stop.
Meanwhile, risks to financial stability loom. Debt and asset prices exceed those in past periods of interest rate hikes. So far, there are still buffers from pandemic-era savings and longer loan terms locked in during years of low borrowing costs. But these buffers are depleting. As they exhaust, growth could slow more than currently expected.
The resulting financial strains will likely come through credit losses. Weak banks risk losing their footing. Historically, banking stress often goes in tandem with higher interest rates. High debt, high asset prices, and high inflation add to the risks. The current episode ticks all the boxes. Although banks are stronger than before, pockets of vulnerability remain, especially where rules to make banks stronger were not applied to smaller banks. As recent experience has shown, even small institutions can trigger systemic collapses in confidence. Non-bank financial institutions will also be challenged. These types of investment firms have grown in leaps and bounds since the Great Financial Crisis. They are rife with hidden leverage and liquidity mismatches. Business models that worked in the era of low-for-long rates will face stern tests in a higher-for-longer one.
Shaky government coffers cloud the picture further. Financial instability, if acute enough, forces governments to step in to backstop markets. And it delivers a growth hit that weakens fiscal revenues. This would heighten already high public debt levels. In turn, any doubts about the government’s ability to pay its bills add to financial instability.
How should policymakers respond to these challenges? Central banks’ task is clear: they must restore price stability. A shift to permanent high inflation would have enormous costs, especially for the most vulnerable in our societies.
To give central banks more room to fight inflation, extra measures must kick in to ensure the safety and stability of financial institutions and the financial system. Where gaps exist, new regulations may be required. Working together, central banks and governments should keep macroprudential policies tight, as this can limit the strains higher rates place on banks. And stiffer bank supervision could remedy some of the faults that came to light in recent bank failures. We urge policymakers to implement Basel III now without further delay.
Fiscal policy must consolidate. This too would help in the fight against inflation and bolster financial resiliency. And it would provide badly-needed buffers that could be deployed against future downturns.
Above all, policy needs to take a longer-term view. Monetary and fiscal policies have carried too much of the burden of sustaining economic growth. As a result, they have severely tested the limits of what we call the region of stability – the mix of monetary and fiscal policy that fosters enduring economic and financial stability and defuses the inevitable tensions between them. History shows that overstepping these boundaries can trigger high inflation, economic slumps, and banking, currency, or sovereign crises.
Policymakers must be realistic about what they can achieve. High inflation and financial instability did not emerge by accident. They were the result of a long journey, reflecting in no small part an overly ambitious view of monetary policy’s ability to hit a small inflation target and a more general belief that macroeconomic policy could support growth indefinitely, without stoking inflation.
Mindsets need to change. They must recognize the shortcomings of repeated emergency action, which stimulates output in downturns but fails to rebuild buffers when growth resumes. To drive long-term economic prosperity, governments need to reinvigorate long-neglected structural reforms. Without a reality check, we risk losing the trust that society needs to have in policymaking. Only price and financial stability can assure wider economic prosperity over the longer term.
Agustín Carstens is the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
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